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We present a North-South model of international trade in which dif-
ferentiated products are developed in the North. Sectors are popu-
lated by ﬁnal-good producers who differ in productivity levels. On the
basis of productivity and sectoral characteristics, ﬁrms decide whether
to integrate into the production of intermediate inputs or outsource
them. In either case they have to decide from which country to source
the inputs. Final-good producers and their suppliers must make
relationship-speciﬁc investments, both in an integrated ﬁrm and in
an arm’s-length relationship. We describe an equilibrium in which
ﬁrms with different productivity levels choose different ownership
structures and supplier locations. We then study the effects of within-
sectoral heterogeneity and variations in industry characteristics on the
relative prevalence of these organizational forms.
I. Introduction
A ﬁrm that chooses to keep the production of an intermediate input
within its boundaries can produce it at home or in a foreign country.
When it keeps it at home, it engages in standard vertical integration.
And when it makes it abroad, it engages in foreign direct investment
(FDI) and intraﬁrm trade. Alternatively, a ﬁrm may choose to outsource
an input in the home country or in a foreign country. When it buys the
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input at home, it engages in domestic outsourcing. And when it buys
it abroad, it engages in foreign outsourcing, or arm’s-length trade. Intel
Corporation provides an example of the FDI strategy: it assembles most
of its microchips in wholly owned subsidiaries in China, Costa Rica,
Malaysia, and the Philippines. On the other hand, Nike provides an
example of the arm’s-length import strategy: it subcontracts most of its
manufacturing to independent producers in Thailand, Indonesia, Cam-
bodia, and Vietnam.
Growth of international specialization has been a dominant feature
of the international economy. Among the many examples that illustrate
this trend, two are particularly telling. Citing Tempest (1996), Feenstra
(1998) illustrates Mattel’s global sourcing strategy in the production of
its star product, the Barbie doll. “Of the $2 export value for the dolls
when they leave Hong Kong for the United States,” he writes, “about
35 cents covers Chinese labor, 65 cents covers the cost of materials
[which are imported from Taiwan, Japan, and the United States], and
the remainder covers transportation and overhead, including proﬁts
earned in Hong Kong” (p. 36). The World Trade Organization provides
another example in its 1998 annual report. In the production of an
“American” car, 30 percent of the car’s value originates in Korea, 17.5
percent in Japan, 7.5 percent in Germany, 4 percent in Taiwan and
Singapore, 2.5 percent in the United Kingdom, and 1.5 percent in
Ireland and Barbados. That is, “only 37 percent of the production value
… is generated in the United States” (p. 36).
The increasing international disintegration of production is large
enough to be noticed in aggregate statistics. Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) use U.S. input-output tables to infer U.S. imports of intermediate
inputs. They ﬁnd that the share of imported intermediates increased
from 5.3 percent of total U.S. intermediate purchases in 1972 to 11.6
percent in 1990. Campa and Goldberg (1997) ﬁnd similar evidence for
Canada and the United Kingdom (but not for Japan). And Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001) show that international trade has
grown faster in components than in ﬁnal goods.
But how important is intraﬁrm relative to arm’s-length trade in in-
termediate inputs? A ﬁrm-level data analysis is needed to answer this
question, and no such analysis is available at this point in time. And
despite the fact that the business press has stressed the spectacular
growth of foreign outsourcing, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2003)
document an equally impressive growth of trade within multinational
ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the fact that, according to data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, imports from foreign afﬁliates of United States–
based ﬁrms had fallen from 23.9 percent of total U.S. imports in 1977
to 16.1 percent in 1982, and remained roughly at this level until 1999,554 journal of political economy
suggests that the growth of foreign outsourcing by U.S. ﬁrms might have
outpaced the growth of their foreign intraﬁrm sourcing.
Other studies have documented a rise in the prevalence of domestic
outsourcing by U.S. ﬁrms. The Economist (1991), Bamford (1994), and
Abraham and Taylor (1996) all report rising subcontracting in particular
industries or activities. A systematic analysis of this trend is not available.
Nevertheless, Fan and Lang (2000) provide indirect evidence of a de-
cline in vertical integration. According to their data, the average number
of four-digit standard industrial classiﬁcation segments in which a U.S.
publicly traded manufacturing company operates declined steadily from
2.72 in 1979 to 1.81 in 1997. This suggests that U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms
have become more specialized over time.
To address issues that arise from the choice of outsourcing versus
integration and home versus foreign production, we need a theoretical
framework in which companies make endogenous organizational
choices. We propose such a framework in this paper by integrating two
recent strands of the literature.
Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) have studied
the effects of within-sectoral heterogeneity on the decisions of ﬁrms to
serve foreign markets. By allowing productivity to differ across ﬁrms,
they show that low-productivity ﬁrms serve only the domestic market,
whereas high-productivity ﬁrms also serve foreign markets. Allowing for
horizontal foreign direct investment, Helpman et al. also show that,
among the ﬁrms that serve foreign markets, the more productive ones
engage in foreign direct investment whereas the less productive ﬁrms
export, and afﬁliate sales relative to exports are larger in sectors with
more productivity dispersion. Their approach emphasizes variations
across ﬁrms within industries, without addressing the organizational
choices of ﬁrms that need to acquire intermediate inputs.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) address the choice between out-
sourcing and integration in a one-input general equilibrium framework,
assuming that all ﬁrms of a given type are equally productive. Their
ﬁrms face the friction of incomplete contracts in arm’s-length relation-
ships, which they weigh against the less efﬁcient production of inputs
in integrated companies. As a result, some sectors have only vertically
integrated ﬁrms whereas others have only disintegrated ﬁrms. Grossman
and Helpman identify sectoral characteristics that lead to one or the
other equilibrium structure. This approach has been extended by Antra `s
(2003a) to a trading environment, by introducing two new features.
First, the friction of incomplete contracts also exists within integrated
ﬁrms, and—as in Grossman and Hart (1986)—integration provides well-
deﬁned property rights. However, these property rights may or may not
give integration an advantage over outsourcing. Second, there are two
inputs, one controlled by the ﬁnal-good producer and the other byglobal sourcing 555
another supplier, inside or outside the ﬁrm. The relative intensity of
these inputs turns out to be an important determinant of the choice
between integration and outsourcing.
By embodying this structure in a Helpman and Krugman (1985) style
two-sector general equilibrium model of trading countries, Antra `s shows
that the sector that is relatively intensive in the input controlled by the
ﬁnal-good producer integrates, whereas the sector that is relatively in-
tensive in the other input outsources. As a result, in the former sector
there is intraﬁrm trade in inputs, and in the latter sector there is arm’s-
length trade.
Building on this literature, we develop a theoretical model that com-
bines the within-sectoral heterogeneity of Melitz (2003) with the struc-
ture of ﬁrms in Antra `s (2003a). The ﬁnal-good producer controls the
supply of headquarter services, whereas a supplier of intermediate goods
controls the quality and quantity of the intermediates. This allows us to
study the impact of variations in productivity within sectors and of dif-
ferences in technological and organizational characteristics across sec-
tors on international trade, foreign direct investment, and the organi-
zational choices of ﬁrms. In this framework, trade, investment, and
organization are interdependent. The incentives created by different
organizations, differences in their ﬁxed costs, and wage differentials
across countries shape the equilibrium organizational structure.
We show that in a world of two countries, North and South, in which
ﬁnal-good producers are based in the North, ﬁnal-good producers that
operate in the same sector but differ by productivity sort into integrated
companies that produce inputs in the North (do not engage in foreign
trade in inputs), integrated companies that produce inputs in the South
(engage in FDI and intraﬁrm trade), disintegrated companies that out-
source in the North (do not engage in foreign trade in inputs), and
disintegrated companies that outsource in the South (import inputs at
arm’s length). Moreover, we show that in sectors with low headquarter
intensity, ﬁrms do not integrate; low-productivity ﬁrms outsource in the
North whereas high-productivity ﬁrms outsource in the South. In sectors
with high headquarter intensity, all four organizational forms may exist
in equilibrium, and, as in sectors with low headquarter intensity, high-
productivity ﬁrms import inputs whereas low-productivity ﬁrms acquire
them in the North. However, among the ﬁrms that acquire inputs in
the same country, the low-productivity ﬁrms outsource whereas the high-
productivity ﬁrms insource. This implies that the least productive ﬁrms
outsource in the North whereas the most productive ﬁrms insource in
the South via foreign direct investment.
We use the model to study the relative prevalence of different organ-
izational forms. We show how prevalence depends on the wage gap
between the North and the South, the trading costs of intermediate556 journal of political economy
inputs, the degree of productivity dispersion within a sector, the distri-
bution of bargaining power, the size of the ownership advantage (which
may be different in the two countries), and the intensity of headquarter
services. Our model predicts that relatively more ﬁnal-good producers
rely on imported intermediates in sectors with higher productivity dis-
persion or lower headquarter intensity. And in sectors with integration
and outsourcing, which are the sectors with high headquarter intensity,
industries with higher productivity dispersion have relatively more ﬁnal-
good producers that integrate. This is true for a comparison of inte-
gration versus outsourcing in each of the countries. As a result, such
sectors have more intraﬁrm trade relative to arm’s-length trade. These
results illustrate the types of issues that can be addressed with our model.
Our model is developed in Section II. In Section III, we characterize
an industry’s equilibrium. Then, in Section IV, we describe the equilib-
rium sorting of ﬁrms into different organizational forms, and we study
in Section V the prevalence of each mode of organization. This is also
the section that examines the effects of variations within and across
sectors on the relative prevalence of organizational forms. Section VI
offers a short summary with concluding comments.
II. The Model
Consider a world with two countries, the North and the South, and a
unique factor of production, labor. The world is populated by a unit
measure of consumers with identical preferences represented by
J 1 m U p x  X ,0 ! m ! 1,  0 j m jp1
where is consumption of a homogeneous good, is an index of xX 0 j
aggregate consumption in sector j, and m is a parameter. Aggregate
consumption in sector j is a constant elasticity of substitution function
1/a
a X p x (i) di ,0 ! a ! 1, j  j []
of the consumption of different varieties , where the range of i will x (i) j
be endogenously determined. The elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties in a given sector is . We assume that , so that 1/(1  a) a 1 m
varieties within a sector are more substitutable for each other than they
are for or for varieties from a different sector. This leads to the inverse x0
demand function for each variety i in sector j:
maa 1 p(i) p Xx (i). ( 1 ) jj j
Producers of differentiated products face a perfectly elastic supply ofglobal sourcing 557
labor in each one of the countries. We denote by the wage rate in
N w
the North and by the wage rate in the South. These wage rates are
S w
ﬁxed, and . The assumption of ﬁxed wage rates and a higher
NS w 1 w
wage rate in the North can be justiﬁed in general equilibrium by as-
suming that is the productivity of labor in producing in country
l wx 0
l, , and that labor supply is large enough in every country so l p N, S
that both countries produce . x0
The demand parameters m and a are the same in every industry, which
helps to focus attention on cross-sectoral differences in technology and
organizational costs. Our aim is to explore how differences in technology
interact with organizational choices in shaping industrial structure, trade
ﬂows, and FDI.
Only the North knows how to produce ﬁnal-good varieties. To start
producing a variety in sector j, a ﬁrm needs to bear a ﬁxed cost of entry
consisting of units of northern labor. Upon paying this ﬁxed cost, the fE
unique producer of variety i in sector j draws a productivity level v from
a known distribution .
1 After observing this productivity level, the G(v)
ﬁnal-good producer decides whether to exit the market or start pro-
ducing; in the latter case, an additional ﬁxed cost of organizing pro-
duction needs to be incurred. As discussed below, this additional ﬁxed
cost is a function of the structure of ownership and the location of
production.
Production of any ﬁnal-good variety requires a combination of two
variety-speciﬁc inputs, and , which we associate with head- h (i) m (i) jj
quarter services and manufactured components, respectively. Output of
every variety is a sector-speciﬁc Cobb-Douglas function of the inputs,
h 1h jj
h (i) m (i) jj x (i) p v ,0 ! h ! 1, (2) jj [] [ ] h 1  h jj
where the productivity parameter v is ﬁrm-speciﬁc whereas the param-
eter is sector-speciﬁc. The larger is, the more intensive the sector hh jj
in headquarter services. Headquarter services can be produced only h (i) j
in the North, with one unit of labor per unit of output, whereas inter-
mediate inputs can be produced in the North and in the South, m (i) j
with one unit of labor per unit of output in each one of the countries.
There are two types of agents engaged in production: ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers, who supply headquarter services, and operators of manufactur-
ing plants, who supply intermediate inputs. We use H to denote a ﬁnal-
good producer and M to denote a supplier of intermediate inputs. Every
1 To be more precise, the unique producer of variety i draws a particular realization
from the distribution . However, we drop the variety index i from in order v(i) G(v) v(i)
to simplify the notation. For the same reason, we drop the sectoral index j from the ﬁxed-
cost variable and the distribution function . fG (7) E558 journal of political economy
ﬁnal-good producer H needs to contract with a manufacturing plant
operator M for the provision of components. We allow international
fragmentation of the production process, so that H can choose to trans-
act with a manufacturing plant operator M in the North or in the South.
It follows from our assumptions that all ﬁnal-good producers locate
in the North. Upon paying the ﬁxed cost of entry, , and observing
N wf E
the productivity level v, the unique ﬁnal-good producer H of variety i
in sector j seeks out a supplier of components M in the North or in the
South. Simultaneously, H chooses whether to insource or outsource
intermediate inputs. The joint management costs of ﬁnal and inter-
mediate goods production, such as supervision, quality control, ac-
counting, and marketing, depend on the organizational form and the
location of M. All these costs, the sum of which we term ﬁxed organi-
zational costs, are denominated in terms of northern labor. We denote
them by , where k is an index of the ownership structure and l is
Nl wf k
an index of the country in which M is located and the manufacturing
of components takes place.
The ownership structure takes one of two forms: vertical integration
V or outsourcing O. The supplier M is located in one of two sites: in
the North N or in the South S. Therefore, and . An k  {V, O} l  {N, S}
organizational form consists of an ownership structure and a location of
M.
We assume that the ﬁxed organizational costs are higher when M is
located in the South regardless of ownership structure, because the ﬁxed
costs of search, monitoring, and communication are signiﬁcantly higher
in the foreign country. Namely, and for . We also
SN SN f 1 ff 1 fk p V, O kV kO
assume that, given the location of M, the ﬁxed organizational costs of
a V ﬁrm are higher than the ﬁxed organizational costs of an O ﬁrm,
namely, for . As a result of these assumptions, the ﬁxed
ll f 1 fl p N, S VO
organizational costs are ranked as follows:
SSNN f 1 f 1 f 1 f . (3) VOVO
We adopt this ordering in order to avoid a taxonomy of cases. There
exists a tension between two considerations that affect the ranking of
and . On the one hand, the need to supervise the production of
ll ff VO
intermediate inputs in addition to other managerial tasks raises man-
agerial overload and the ﬁxed organizational costs of a V ﬁrm relative
to an O ﬁrm. On the other hand, economies of scope in the management
of diverse activities reduce the ﬁxed organizational costs of a V ﬁrm
relative to an O ﬁrm. Our ordering amounts to assuming that managerial
overload is more important than managerial economies of scope. Al-
though we believe this assumption to be appropriate in many instances,
and we therefore maintain it in the main analysis, we shall point out
how some of the results change when .
ll f ! f VOglobal sourcing 559
The setting is one of incomplete contracts. Final-good producers and
manufacturing plant operators cannot sign ex ante enforceable con-
tracts specifying the purchase of specialized intermediate inputs for a
certain price. In addition, the parties cannot write enforceable contracts
contingent on the amount of labor hired or on the volume of sales
revenues obtained when the ﬁnal good is sold. One can use arguments
of the type developed by Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) to
justify this speciﬁcation, namely, that the parties cannot commit not to
renegotiate an initial contract and that the precise nature of the re-
quired input is revealed only ex post and is not veriﬁable by a third
party. To simplify the analysis, we just impose these constraints on the
contracting environment.
Because no enforceable contract can be signed ex ante, ﬁnal-good
producers and manufacturing plant operators bargain over the surplus
from the relationship after the inputs have been produced. We model
this ex post bargaining as a generalized Nash bargaining game in which
the ﬁnal-good producer obtains a fraction of the ex post gains b  (0, 1)
from the relationship.
2
Following the property rights approach to the theory of the ﬁrm, we
assume that ex post bargaining takes place both under outsourcing and
under integration. The distribution of surplus is sensitive, however, to
the mode of organization. More speciﬁcally, the outside option of H is
assumed to be different when it owns the manufacturing plant than
when it does not. In the latter case, a failure to reach an agreement on
the distribution of the surplus leaves both parties with no income, be-
cause the inputs are tailored speciﬁcally to the other party in the trans-
action. However, by vertically integrating the production of components,
H is effectively buying the right to ﬁre M and seize the inputs . If m (i) j
there were no costs associated with ﬁring the operator of the manufac-
turing plant, the ﬁnal-good producer would always have an incentive to
seize the inputs ex post, and M would have an incentive to choose m (i) j
ex ante (which of course would imply ). In this case, m (i) p 0 x (i) p 0 j j
integration would never be chosen. We therefore assume that ﬁring M
results in a loss of a fraction of ﬁnal-good production, because H
l 1  d
cannot use the intermediate inputs without M as effectively as it can
with the cooperation of M.
3 We also assume that . This captures
NS d ≥ d
the notion that a contractual breach is likely to be more costly to H
when M is in the South. More ﬁguratively, we think of this assumption
as reﬂecting less corruption and better legal protection in the North.
2 This speciﬁcation is similar to the one in Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antra `s
(2003a, 2003b).
3 The fact that the fraction of ﬁnal-good production lost is independent of greatly hj
simpliﬁes the analysis, but it is not necessary for the qualitative results discussed below.560 journal of political economy
As is clear from the weak inequality, however, our results still hold when
.
4 NS d p d
The location of M and the mode of ownership are chosen ex ante
by H to maximize its proﬁts. There is an inﬁnitely elastic supply of M
agents in each one of the countries. Each ﬁnal-good producer H offers
a contract that seeks to attract a plant operator M. The contract includes
an up-front fee for participation in the relationship that has to be paid
by M. This fee can be positive or negative; that is, the operator can
make a payment to the ﬁnal-good producer or vice versa. The purpose
of the fee is to secure the participation of M in the relationship at
minimum cost to H. When the supply of M is inﬁnitely elastic, M’s proﬁts
from the relationship net of the participation fee are equal in equilib-
rium to its ex ante outside option. For simplicity, we set M’se xa n t e
outside option equal to zero in both countries. It is, however, easy to
extend the analysis to cases in which these outside options are positive
and different in the North and in the South.
III. Equilibrium
Consider the payoffs in the bargaining game for a pair of agents H and
M in sector j. Since from now on we discuss a particular sector, for
simplicity we drop the index j from all the variables. If the parties agree
in the bargaining, the potential revenue from the sale of the ﬁnal goods
is , which, using (1) and (2), we can write as R(i) p p(i)x(i)
ah a(1h)
h(i) m(i) maa R(i) p X v . (4) [] [ ] h 1  h
If they fail to agree, however, the outside option of M is always zero,
whereas that of H varies with the ownership structure and the location
of components manufacturing.
When H outsources components, its outside option is also zero, re-
gardless of the location of the manufacturing plant. In this event, H
gets and M gets . bR(i)( 1  b)R(i)
As in Grossman and Hart (1986), our assumptions imply that the
ﬁnal-good producer has more leverage under vertical integration. When
the parties fail to reach an agreement, H can sell an amount of
l dx(i)
output when its manufacturing plant is in country l, which yields the
revenue . The ex post gains from trade in this case are
l a (d) R(i)[ 1 
. In the bargaining, H receives its outside option plus a fraction
l a (d)] R(i)
4 We maintain a distinction between and in order to show in Sec. V that these
NS dd
two parameters affect the relative prevalence of different organizational forms in distinct
ways.global sourcing 561
b of the quasi rents, that is, , and M obtains
l a l a (d) R(i)  b[1  (d)] R(i)
.
l a (1  b)[1  (d)] R(i)
Notice that the payoffs in the bargaining game are proportional to
the revenue. With denoting the payoff of H under ownership
l b R(i) k
structure k and the location of M in country l, the assumption
NS d ≥ d
implies that
NN a N a S b p (d )  b[1  (d )]≥ b VV
S a S a NS p (d )  b[1  (d )]1 b p b p b. (5) OO
That is, ﬁnal-good producers are able to appropriate higher fractions
of revenue under integration than under outsourcing, with this fraction
being higher when integration takes place in the North. As in Grossman
and Hart (1986), integration gives H residual rights of control that allow
it ex post to use the inputs produced by M, which in turn enhances H’s
bargaining position. As a result, H gets a higher fraction of the revenue
under integration.
Since the delivery of the inputs and is not contractible ex h(i) m(i)
ante, the parties choose their quantities noncooperatively; every supplier
maximizes its own payoff. In particular, H provides an amount of head-
quarter services that maximizes , whereas M provides an
lN b R(i)  wh (i) k
amount of components that maximizes . Combin-
ll (1  b )R(i)  wm (i) k
ing the ﬁrst-order conditions of these two programs, using (4), we can
express the total value of the relationship, as measured by total operating
proﬁts, as
l (ma)/(1a) a/(1a) lN l p(v, X, h) p X vw (h)  wf, (6) kk k
where
ll 1  a[bh (1  b )(1  h)] kk l w(h) p . (7) k Nl h ll 1ha /(1a) {(1/a)(w /b )[ w/(1  b )] } kk
Note that among the arguments of the proﬁt function , the
l p(v, X, h) k
ﬁrst one is ﬁrm-speciﬁc whereas the others are industry-speciﬁc. More-
over, while h is a parameter measuring the intensity of headquarter
services, the consumption index X is endogenous to the industry but
exogenous to the producer of a speciﬁc variety of the ﬁnal good.
Our assumptions imply that the ﬁnal-good producer chooses the or-
ganizational form that maximizes . To see why, recall that ex
l p(v, X, h) k
ante, before a relationship between H and M has been formed, H offers
a contract designed to attract an M agent whose ex ante outside option
is zero, and the contract includes a participation fee, say , that has t  0
to be paid by M. Under these circumstances the ﬁnal-good producer
of brand i expects to earn operating proﬁts
ll p p b R(i)  t  Hk k
, where represents the component of the ﬁxed costs
NN l l wh (i)  wf f Hk Hk562 journal of political economy
that H has to bear when M is located in l and the ownership structure
is k. On the other hand, M expects to earn operating proﬁts
l p p Mk
from the relationship with H, where
ll N l (1  b )R(i)  t  wm (i)  wf kM k
represents the component of the ﬁxed costs that M has to bear. By
l fMk
deﬁnition, . Next, note that H has an incentive to raise t
ll l f  f p f Hk Mk k
as much as possible, as long as the participation constraint is
l p ≥ 0 Mk
satisﬁed, because once a relationship between H and M is formed, the
participation fee has no further effects on the outcomes. As a result,
the equilibrium value of t satisﬁes , which implies that
ll p p 0 p p Mk Hk
. It follows that in a subgame-perfect equi-
Nl N l R(i)  wh (i)  wm (i)  wf k
librium, .
ll p p p(v, X, h) Hk k
Upon observing its productivity level v, a ﬁnal-good producer H
chooses the ownership structure and the location of manufacturing that
maximizes (6), or exits the industry and forfeits the ﬁxed cost of entry
. It is clear from (6) that the latter outcome occurs whenever v is
N wf E
below a threshold v, denoted by , at which the operating proﬁts v  (0, )
l p(v, X, h) p max p(v, X, h) (8) k
k{V,O},l{N,S}
equal zero. Namely, is implicitly deﬁned by v
p(v, X, h) p 0. (9)
This threshold productivity level depends on the sector’s aggregate con-
sumption index X, that is, . v(X)
In solving the problem on the right-hand side of (8), a ﬁnal-good
producer effectively chooses the triplet that maximizes (6).
ll l (b , w , f ) kk
It is straightforward to see that is decreasing in both and
ll p(v, X, h) w k
. For this reason, ﬁnal-good producers prefer to organize production
l fk
so as to minimize both variable and ﬁxed costs. On account of variable
costs, southern manufacturing is preferred to northern manufacturing
regardless of the ownership structure (because ). On account
NS w 1 w
of ﬁxed costs, however, the ranking of proﬁt levels is the reverse of the
ranking of ﬁxed-cost levels in (3).
Next, note that if the ﬁnal-good producer could freely choose its
fraction of revenue , it would choose that maximizes
l ∗ bb  [0, 1] k
. This fraction is
l w(h) k
 h(ah  1  a)  h(1  h)(1  ah)(ah  1  a)
∗ b (h) p . (10)
2h  1
Although a higher gives H a larger fraction of the revenue, it also
l bk
induces M to produce fewer components. As a result, the ﬁnal-good
producer trades the choice of a larger fraction of the revenue for a
smaller revenue level.global sourcing 563
Fig. 1.—Distribution of revenue that maximizes joint proﬁts
The function is depicted by the solid curve in ﬁgure 1. It rises
∗ b (h)
in h; and .
5 To understand these properties, notice
∗∗ b (0) p 0 b (1) p 1
that in the ex post bargaining, neither H nor M appropriates the full
marginal return to its investments in the supply of headquarter services
and components, respectively. This leads them to underinvest in the
provision of these inputs. Each party’s severity of underinvestment is
inversely related to the fraction of the surplus that it appropriates. Ex
ante efﬁciency then requires giving a larger share of the revenue to the
party undertaking the relatively more important investment. As a result,
the higher the intensity of headquarter services (the larger h is), the
higher the proﬁt-maximizing fraction of the surplus accruing to the
ﬁnal-good producer (the higher is).
∗ b
Following Grossman and Hart (1986), we do not allow a free ex ante
choice of the division rule of the surplus. The choice of ownership
structure and the location of the manufacturing of components are the
only instruments for affecting the division rule, in the sense that the
ﬁnal-good producer is constrained to choose a in the set
lN N b {b , b , kV O
. When h is close to one, higher values of yield higher proﬁts.
SS l b , b } b VO k
5 Notice also that it does not depend on factor prices and that it is less nonlinear the
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Given the ordering in (5), this implies that H would have chosen do-
mestic integration if there were no other differences in the costs and
beneﬁts of the competing organizational forms. Conversely, when h is
close to zero, lower values of yield higher proﬁts, and H would have
l bk
chosen outsourcing in the absence of other differences in the costs and
beneﬁts of the organizational forms. Naturally, there are other differ-
ences in the costs and beneﬁts of various organizational forms. As a
result, the proﬁt-maximizing choice of an ownership structure and the
location of the manufacturing of components depends on a ﬁrm’s pro-
ductivity level.
Free entry ensures that, in equilibrium, the expected operating proﬁts
of a potential entrant equal the ﬁxed cost of entry. From the discussion
above, a ﬁrm that draws a productivity level below chooses to exit v(X)
because its operating proﬁts are negative. On the other hand, ﬁrms with
stay in the industry, and they choose organizational forms that v ≥ v(X)
maximize their proﬁts. Under the circumstances, the free-entry con-
dition can be expressed as

N p(v, X, h)dG(v) p wf.( 1 1 )  E
v(X)
This condition provides an implicit solution to the sector’s real con-
sumption index X. Using the sector’s consumption index, we then can
calculate all other variables of interest, such as the threshold productivity
level of surviving entrants, the organizational forms of ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers with different productivity levels, and the number of entrants.
IV. Organizational Forms
The choice of an organizational form faces two types of tensions. In
terms of the location decision, variable costs are lower in the South, but
ﬁxed costs are higher there. In terms of the integration decision, in-
sourcing entails higher ﬁxed costs and gives H a larger fraction of the
revenue. This does not necessarily beneﬁt H; although it raises H’si n -
centive to supply headquarter services, it reduces M’s incentive to supply
components. If the effect on M’s incentives is strong enough, H’s proﬁts
may be lower under integration. These trade-offs are the central con-
siderations in the choice of an organizational form.
To simplify the discussion, we examine in this section organizational
forms in only two types of sectors: those with relatively high headquarter
intensity and those with relatively low headquarter intensity. Interme-
diate cases can be similarly analyzed. We show below that ﬁrms sort into
organizational forms according to the patterns depicted in ﬁgure 2.
First, in component-intensive sectors (i.e., low h), ﬁrms do not integrate;global sourcing 565
Fig. 2.—Organizational forms
high-productivity ﬁrms outsource components in the South, low-pro-
ductivity ﬁrms outsource them in the North, and the least productive
ﬁrms exit. On the other hand, integration takes place in headquarter-
intensive sectors (i.e., high h). The most productive ﬁrms integrate in
the South and somewhat less productive ﬁrms outsource in the South.
Firms with even lower productivity acquire components in the North,
and among them the more productive integrate and the less productive
outsource. The least productive ﬁrms exit. Note that surviving ﬁrms with
the lowest productivity outsource in the North in all sectors. And more
generally, less productive ﬁrms acquire components in the North
whereas more productive ﬁrms acquire them in the South.
We now derive these results. First consider a sector with low head-
quarter intensity h, such that ; we refer to it as a
∗ NS b (h) ! b p b p b OO
component-intensive sector. This case is depicted in ﬁgure 1 by h p
, where the arrows indicate the direction in which proﬁts rise with hM
changes in ; that is, the proﬁt function is decreasing in . In this
ll l bp ( 7) b kk k
type of sector, H prefers outsourcing to insourcing in every country l,
because outsourcing has lower ﬁxed costs and it gives H a lower fraction
of the revenue. Under these circumstances, integration is not an optimal
strategy. In choosing between domestic and foreign outsourcing, how-
ever, H trades off the lower variable costs of southern manufacturing
against the lower ﬁxed organizational costs in the North. Depending
on whether the cross-country difference in the wage rate is small or
large relative to the cross-country difference in the ﬁxed organizational
costs, the resulting equilibrium can have outsourcing in both countries
or outsourcing in the South only.
Figure 3 depicts the ﬁrst case, in which the wage differential is small
relative to the ﬁxed-cost differential, that is, .
NS S N (1a)/a(1h) w /w ! (f /f ) OO
The variable is measured along the horizontal axis and operating
a/(1a) v
proﬁts are measured along the vertical axis. It is evident from (6) that
the operating proﬁt function is linear in , and it has the
l a/(1a) p( 7) v k
intercept . The slope of this function is proportional to . It
Nl l wf w(h) k k
follows that the proﬁt line in ﬁgure 3 is steeper than the proﬁt line
S pO
, because wages are lower in the South.
N pO
Firms with productivity below expect negative proﬁts under all vM
organizational forms. Therefore, they exit the industry. Firms with pro-566 journal of political economy
Fig. 3.—Equilibrium in the component-intensive sector
ductivity between and attain the highest proﬁts by outsourcing
N vv MM O
in the North, whereas ﬁrms with productivity above attain the highest
N vMO
proﬁts by outsourcing in the South. The cutoffs and are given
N vv MM O
by
(1a)/a
NN wf O (am)/a v p X , M N [] w (h) O
(1a)/a
NS N w (f  f ) OO N (am)/a v p X . (12) MO SN [] w (h)  w (h) OO
It also is clear from ﬁgure 3 that the intersection point of the two
proﬁt lines takes place at a negative proﬁt level when the ﬁxed organ-
izational costs of outsourcing in the South are close to the ﬁxed organ-
izational costs of outsourcing in the North, that is, when
NS w /w 1
. In this case the threshold productivity level is de-
SN (1a)/a(1h) (f /f ) v OO M
ﬁned by the point of intersection of the proﬁt line with the horizontal
S pO
axis. As a result, all ﬁrms with productivity below this threshold exit and
all ﬁrms with higher productivity levels outsource in the South. This
describes the second type of equilibrium, in which no ﬁrm outsources
in the North.
We shall treat the equilibrium with outsourcing in both countries—global sourcing 567
Fig. 4.—Equilibrium in the headquarter-intensive sector
depicted in ﬁgure 3—as the benchmark case. In this event the free-
entry condition (11), together with (6) and (8), imply
NN S N w (h)[V(v )  V(v )]  w (h)[V()  V(v )] OM OM O M O N (am)/(1a) wX p , (13) NN S N f  f [G(v )  G(v )]  f [1  G(v )] E O MO M O MO
where
v
a/(1a) V(v) p yd G (y). 
0
Equations (12) and (13) provide implicit solutions for the cutoffs vM
and and for the aggregate consumption index X.
N vMO
We next consider a sector with high headquarter intensity h, such
that . We refer to it as a headquarter-intensive sector. A sector
∗ N b (h) 1 bV
of this type is represented by in ﬁgure 1. In this sector, proﬁts h p hH
are increasing in , as shown by the arrows in the ﬁgure. In a head-
l bk
quarter-intensive sector, the marginal product of headquarter services
is high, making underinvestment in h especially costly and integration
especially attractive. This is reﬂected in the slopes of the proﬁt lines in
ﬁgure 4; is steeper than for , because .
ll l l pp l p N, S w (h) 1 w (h) VO V O
Next compare the slopes of and . On the one hand, integration
NS pp VO
gives the ﬁnal-good producer a larger fraction of the revenue, making568 journal of political economy
steeper. On the other hand, variable production costs are lower in
N pV
the South, making steeper. For these reasons the proﬁt line of out-
S pO
sourcing in the South can be steeper or ﬂatter than the proﬁt line of
integration in the North. That is, can be larger or smaller than
S w (h) O
. In particular, if and only if
NS N N S 1h N w (h) w (h) 1 w (h)( w /w ) 1 f(b , VO V V
, where
6 h)/f(b, h)
(1a)/ah 1h f(z, h) { {1  a[zh  (1  z)(1  h)]} z (1  z).
First consider the case in which the wage differential is large relative
to the difference between and b, so that . Under these
NS N bw (h) 1 w (h) VO V
circumstances,
SSNN w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h). (14) VOVO
Given the orderings in (3) and (14), the orders of the intercepts and the
slopes of the proﬁt functions are as depicted in ﬁgure 4. Moreover, the
ﬁgure depicts our benchmark case for headquarter-intensive sectors, in
which all four organizational forms exist in equilibrium, with outsourcing
and insourcing taking place in both countries. Firms with productivity
below exit the industry, those with productivity between and
N vv v H HH O
outsource in the North, those with productivity between and in-
NN vv HO HV
tegrate in the North, those with productivity between and out-
NS vv HV HO
source in the South, and those with productivity above integrate in
S vHO
the South (engage in vertical FDI).
It is easy to see that either one of the ﬁrst three organizational forms
may not exist in equilibrium but that the last one always exists in the
absence of an upper bound on the support of . That is, there always G(v)
exist high-productivity ﬁnal-good producers that choose to insource
components in the South. And more generally, the organizational forms
that survive in equilibrium attract ﬁrms according to the sorting pattern
described in ﬁgure 4. If, for example, integration in the North and
outsourcing in the South are viable, ﬁrms that outsource in the South
have higher productivity than ﬁrms that insource in the North. But
insourcing in the North would not be viable if its ﬁxed organizational
costs were too high.
In the next section, where we study variations in the relative preva-
6 In component-intensive sectors, the inequality always
NS 1h N (w /w ) 1 f(b , h)/f(b, h) V
holds, because in these sectors is declining in z, and therefore the right-hand side f(z, h)
is smaller than one (recall that ). On the other hand, in headquarter-intensive
N b 1 b V
sectors, the right-hand side is larger than one, because in such sectors is increasing f(z, h)
in z. Therefore, the inequality holds only if the wage rate is sufﬁciently higher in the
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lence of different organizational forms, we focus on the benchmark case
depicted in ﬁgure 4, for which the cutoffs are given by
(1a)/a
NN wf O (am)/a v p X , H N [] w (h) O
(1a)/a
NN N w (f  f ) VO N (am)/a v p X , HO NN [] w (h)  w (h) VO
(1a)/a
NS N w (f  f ) OV N (am)/a v p X , HV SN [] w (h)  w (h) OV
(1a)/a
NS S w (f  f ) VO S (am)/a v p X . (15) HO SS [] w (h)  w (h) VO
We can also use the free-entry condition (11) to derive an equation that
is analogous to (13). This equation together with (15) can then be used
to solve for the cutoffs and the consumption index X.
Next consider the case in which the wage differential is small, so that
in the headquarter-intensive sector. In this
NS 1h N (w /w ) ! f(b , h)/f(b, h) V
event, is steeper than and the ordering in (14) is not preserved.
NS pp VO
In this case there are two possibilities only: either
SN w (h) 1 w (h) 1 VV
or (because ).
SN NSSN SN w (h) 1 w (h) w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h) w (h) 1 w (h) OO V VOO OO
When , integration in the North domi-
SNSN w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h) VVOO
nates outsourcing in the South, because the proﬁt line in ﬁgure 4
N pV
has a higher intercept and a larger slope than . As a result, at most
S pO
three organizational forms exist in equilibrium: outsourcing in the
North, chosen by low-productivity ﬁrms; insourcing in the North, chosen
by intermediate-productivity ﬁrms; and insourcing in the South, chosen
by high-productivity ﬁrms. On the other hand, when
NS w (h) 1 w (h) 1 VV
, integration in the North dominates outsourcing and in-
SN w (h) 1 w (h) OO
sourcing in the South, in which case there is no international trade in
intermediate inputs. As a result, at most two organizational forms can
exist in equilibrium: outsourcing in the North, chosen by low-produc-
tivity ﬁrms, and insourcing in the North, chosen by high-productivity
ﬁrms.
7
7 Our analysis has so far assumed that the ordering of the ﬁxed costs (3) is satisﬁed.
Now suppose instead that the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing are higher than the ﬁxed costs
of integration in each one of the countries, but that the ﬁxed costs of integration in the
South are higher than the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing in the North, i.e., .
SSNN f 1 f 1 f 1 f OVO V
In addition, suppose that the ranking of the slopes of the proﬁt functions (14) holds.
Then, in a headquarter-intensive sector, integration dominates outsourcing in both coun-
tries, because the ﬁxed costs of integration are lower than the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing
and the proﬁt line of an integrated ﬁrm is steeper than the proﬁt line of an outsourcing570 journal of political economy
We have shown that in our benchmark cases the equilibrium organ-
izational forms follow the patterns depicted in ﬁgure 2. This sorting
pattern differs from the sorting pattern derived by Grossman and Help-
man (in press) for organizational structures that use managerial incen-
tives a ` la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994).
8 Contrary to our results, in
their model, surviving low-productivity ﬁrms acquire components in the
South. Within this group, less productive ﬁrms outsource whereas more
productive ﬁrms insource. While no one outsources inputs in the North,
there exist ﬁrms with modestly high productivity that integrate in the
North. However, the most productive ﬁrms, like the least productive
ﬁrms, outsource in the South. Evidently, these alternative theories of
the ﬁrm predict different sorting patterns. Empirical evidence is needed
to discriminate between them, but no such evidence is available for the
time being.
9
V. Prevalence of Organizational Forms
Our model predicts variations in organizational forms across ﬁrms and
industries. In the previous section we examined variations across ﬁrms.
Now we ask, How does the prevalence of organizational forms vary across
industries? To answer this question, we use the fraction of ﬁrms that
choose a particular organizational form as the measure of prevalence.
We show in the Appendix, however, that using instead the market share
of these ﬁrms as a measure of prevalence yields similar results.
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we choose to be a Pareto G(v)
distribution with shape z, that is,
z b
G(v) p 1  for v ≥ b 1 0, (16) () v
ﬁrm. As a result, no ﬁrm outsources and at most two organizational forms exist in equi-
librium: low-productivity ﬁrms insource in the North whereas high-productivity ﬁrms in-
source in the South. On the other hand, in a component-intensive sector, all four organ-
izational forms can exist in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the least productive ﬁrms
insource in the North, some more productive ﬁrms outsource in the North, still higher-
productivity ﬁrms insource in the South, and the most productive ﬁrms outsource in the
South. These results illustrate the inﬂuence of ﬁxed costs on the sorting patterns. Note,
however, that independently of whether the ﬁxed organizational costs of insourcing are
higher than the ﬁxed organizational costs of outsourcing, integration is more prevalent
in headquarter-intensive sectors.
8 They did not distinguish between component- and headquarter-intensive sectors, how-
ever, although one can interpret their production technology as having , i.e., a zero h p 0
output elasticity with respect to headquarter services. For this reason a comparison of the
cross-section variation of organizational forms that is based on the component-intensive
and headquarter-intensive distinction cannot be made with their work.
9 The empowerment of workers may also be an important determinant of the structure
of ﬁrms. Puga and Treﬂer (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2003) have developed general
equilibrium frameworks in which every ﬁrm chooses endogenously the structure of au-
thority within the organization.global sourcing 571
where z is large enough to ensure a ﬁnite variance of the size distribution
of ﬁrms. In this event the distribution of sales is also Pareto, which is
consistent with the evidence (see Axtell 2001; Helpman et al. 2004).
For concreteness we discuss only the benchmark cases of component-
and headquarter-intensive sectors as deﬁned in Section IV.
A. Component-Intensive Sector
Recall that in a component-intensive sector no ﬁrm integrates. In the
benchmark case depicted in ﬁgure 3, ﬁrms with productivity below vM
exit the industry, those with productivity between and outsource
N vv MM O
in the North, and higher-productivity ﬁrms outsource in the South.
Denote by the fraction of active ﬁrms that outsource in country
l jMO
l. Then and . The Pareto
SN N S j p [1  G(v )]/[1  G(v )] j p 1  j MO MO M MO MO
distribution (16) then implies that . Substituting (12)
z SN j p (v /v ) MO M MO
into this expression yields
z(1a)/a
SN N w (h)  w (h) f OO O S j p . (17) MO NS N [] w (h) f  f OO O
As is clear from equation (17), is a function only of the ratio of
S jMO
slopes and the ratio of ﬁxed costs . In order to study
SN S N w (h)/w (h) f /f OO O O
how the different parameters of the model affect the relative prevalence
of foreign outsourcing, it is therefore sufﬁcient to analyze their effect
on these ratios.
First consider the southern wage rate. A lower wage in the South
raises the proﬁtability of outsourcing in the South, that is, raises
. As a result, outsourcing in the South becomes more prev-
SN w (h)/w (h) OO
alent; that is, increases. In addition, it can be shown that rises
S jv MO M
in the industry equilibrium, leading to exit of a larger fraction of ﬁrms.
The model can easily be extended to incorporate transport costs for
intermediate inputs. If the shipment of components is subjected to
melting iceberg–type transport costs, then a fall in transport costs is
very similar to a decline in the southern wage rate. It follows that, as
in Melitz (2003), lower transport costs lead to more exit of low-pro-
ductivity ﬁrms and to more prevalence of foreign outsourcing.
Second, consider an increase in the dispersion of productivity, which
is represented by a decline of z. Since the expression in the brackets
on the right-hand side of (17) represents the ratio of the cutoffs
and this ratio is smaller than one, a rise in dispersion raises the
N v /v MM O
fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in the South.
10
10 This is similar, in terms of the mechanism at work, to the ﬁnding in Melitz (2003)
that more dispersion raises the share of exporting ﬁrms in domestic outputandtheﬁnding
in Helpman et al. (2004) that more dispersion raises horizontal FDI relative to exports.572 journal of political economy
Third, note that the headquarter intensity also affects the preva-
lence of outsourcing in the two countries. Since
SN w (h)/w (h) p OO
, it follows that foreign outsourcing is less prevalent in
NS (1h)a/(1a) (w /w )
sectors with higher headquarter intensity, because the less important
components in production are, the less important the cost savings from
outsourcing in the South compared to the higher ﬁxed organizational
costs of foreign outsourcing.
Finally, we have assumed for simplicity that an outsourcing ﬁnal-good
producer H appropriates a fraction b of the surplus from its relationship
with an input supplier M, irrespective of whether M is in the North or
in the South. Imagine, however, a situation in which this fraction can
differ across countries, and H now gets a smaller fraction of the surplus
from outsourcing in the South, but still higher than , so that the
∗ b (h)
sector remains component-intensive. This decline in H’s bargaining
power raises the proﬁtability of outsourcing in the South, making for-
eign outsourcing more prevalent.
B. Headquarter-Intensive Sector
Four organizational forms exist in the benchmark case of a headquarter-
intensive sector. Ordered from low to high productivity, they are out-
sourcing in the North, insourcing in the North, outsourcing in the
South, and insourcing in the South (see ﬁgs. 2 and 4). We denote by
the fraction of ﬁrms that choose the organizational form (k, l), where
l jHk
k is the ownership structure and l is the location of M. Using the Pareto
distribution (16) and the cutoffs (15), we can express these fractions
as
z(1a)/a
NN N w (h)w (h) f VO O N j p 1 , HO NN N [] w (h) f f OV O
z(1a)/a z(1a)/a
NN N SN N w (h)w (h) f w (h)w (h) f VO O OV O N j p  , HV NN N NS N [] [ ] w (h) f f w (h) f f OV O OO V
z(1a)/a z(1a)/a
SN N SS N w (h)w (h) f w (h)w (h) f OV O VO O S j p  , HO NS N NS S [] [ ] w (h) f f w (h) f f OO V OV O
z(1a)/a
SS N w (h)w (h) f VO O S j p .( 1 8 ) HV NS S [] w (h) f f OV O
We again ﬁrst consider a lowering of the wage rate in the South.
Lower wages in the South raise the proﬁtability of foreign sourcing. Inglobal sourcing 573
particular, (7) implies that and increase whereas and
SS N w (h) w (h) w (h) VO V
do not change. It then follows from (18) that does not change
N N w (h) j O HO
whereas declines. The reason is that low-productivity ﬁrms that out-
N jHV
source in the North are too far from productivity levels that make foreign
sourcing proﬁtable. As a result, small changes in the proﬁtability of
foreign sourcing do not make the acquisition of inputs in the South
attractive to these ﬁrms. On the other hand, among the integrated
producers in the North, the most productive are indifferent between
integration in the North and outsourcing in the South. Therefore, for
these ﬁrms a decline in the South’s wage rate tilts the balance in favor
of foreign outsourcing. As a result, declines and rises.
11 Finally,
NS jj HV HO
rises. Naturally, a decline in the cost of southern labor induces a
S jHV
reorganization that favors foreign sourcing. But the model also predicts
that the effect is disproportionately large on foreign outsourcing relative
to FDI. At the same time the unfavorable effect on the acquisition of
inputs in the North falls disproportionately on integration. It follows
that outsourcing rises overall relative to integration.
A fall in transport costs of intermediate inputs has the same effects
as a fall in . It is interesting to note that the recent trends described
S w
in the Introduction are in line with the model’s predictions about falling
costs of doing business in the South. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) point
out that transport costs have declined and foreign assembly has in-
creased both in house and at arm’s length. Furthermore, the data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis suggest that the growth of foreign
outsourcing might have outpaced that of foreign direct investment. Fi-
nally, as predicted by the model, U.S. domestic outsourcing seems to
have increased relative to U.S. domestic insourcing.
12
Second, we examine a decline in z, which represents an increase in
the dispersion of productivity across ﬁrms. It is evident from (18) that
a decline in z reduces the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in the North
and increases the fraction of ﬁrms that insource in the South. The effect
on the share of ﬁrms that insource in the North or outsource in the
South is ambiguous, however. Yet the share of ﬁnal-good producers who
import components from the South rises, and so does the prevalence
of FDI relative to outsourcing in the South (i.e., the ratio ) and
SS j /j HV HO
the prevalence of integration relative to outsourcing in the North (i.e.,
the ratio ).
NN j /j HV HO
Third, we consider variations in headquarter intensity. In sectors with
11 This is easy to see from (18) by noting that the ratio is independent of
SS w (h)/w (h) VO
the wage rate .
S w
12 As in the component-intensive sector, lower labor costs in the South or lowertransport
costs of intermediates increase the cutoff productivity level below which ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers exit the industry in a headquarter-intensive sector. This implies a higher proportion
of exiting ﬁrms.574 journal of political economy
higher headquarter intensity, domestic outsourcing is favored relative
to foreign outsourcing and integration is favored relative to outsourcing.
That is, the ratios and for are higher in
NS l l w (h)/w (h) w (h)/w (h) l p N, S OO V O
sectors with higher values of h (see Antra `s 2003a). Equations (18) then
imply that the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in the North falls with
h whereas the fraction of ﬁrms that insource in the North rises. More-
over, the sum of these two shares goes up, implying that a larger h
reduces the fraction of ﬁrms that import components. As for the com-
position of imported inputs, we cannot sign the effects of h on the
fraction of ﬁrms that insource in the South. Nevertheless, (18) implies
that the ratio rises and, hence, that falls. Namely, FDI be-
SS S j /jj HV HO HO
comes more prevalent relative to arm’s-length imports. It follows that
in a cross section of headquarter-intensive sectors, integration is more
prevalent and outsourcing is less prevalent the more headquarter-
intensive the sector is. This prediction is in line with the ﬁndings of
Antra `s (2003a), who shows that in a panel of 23 manufacturing indus-
tries and four years of data, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S.
imports is signiﬁcantly higher, the higher the research and development
intensity of the industry.
Fourth, consider the revenue shares , . An increase in ,
lS b l p N, S b VV
which can result from a reduction in corruption or an improvement in
the legal system in the South, raises the slope of the proﬁt line without
S pV
affecting the slopes of other proﬁt lines. Equations (18) then imply that
the shares of ﬁrms that source components in the North, and ,
NN jj HO HV
do not change. In this event, the fraction of ﬁrms that source compo-
nents in the South does not change, except that among them the frac-
tion of outsourcing ﬁrms declines and the fraction of insourcing ﬁrms
rises.
An increase in makes integration in the North more proﬁtable,
N bV
thereby raising the slope of the proﬁt line . It then follows from (18)
N pV
that the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in the North declines, the
fraction of ﬁrms that insource in the North rises, the fraction of ﬁrms
that outsource in the South declines, and the fraction of ﬁrms that
insource in the South does not change. Here the interesting implication
is that a shift that makes integration more attractive in the North changes
the composition of foreign sourcing in favor of FDI.
Finally, consider an increase in the primitive bargaining power pa-
rameter b. It can be shown that it reduces the ratios and
Sl w (h)/w (h) VO
for as well as . The reason is that an
Nl NS w (h)/w (h) l p N, S w (h)/w (h) VO VV
increase in b shifts the bargaining power in favor of H, regardless of
ownership structure. As a result, outsourcing becomes more attractive
to H. In this event the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource components rises
in each one of the countries. On the other hand, the share of ﬁrms
that insource components declines in each one of the countries. More-global sourcing 575
over, the fraction of ﬁrms that import components rises. That is, the
fraction of ﬁrms that outsource components in the South rises more
than the fraction of ﬁrms that insource components in the South de-
clines. It follows that an increase in b biases the acquisition of inputs
toward imports on the one hand and toward outsourcing as opposed
to integration on the other.
VI. Concluding Comments
We have developed a theoretical framework for studying global sourcing
strategies. In our model, heterogeneous ﬁnal-good producers choose
organizational forms. That is, they choose ownership structures and
locations for the production of intermediate inputs. Headquarter ser-
vices are always produced in the home country (the North). Interme-
diate inputs can be produced at home or in the low-wage South, and
the production of intermediates can be owned by the ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer or by an independent supplier.
Final-good producers and suppliers of components make relationship-
speciﬁc investments, which are governed by imperfect contracts. In
choosing between a domestic and a foreign supplier of parts, a ﬁnal-
good producer trades off the beneﬁts of lower variable costs in the South
against the beneﬁts of lower ﬁxed costs in the North. On the other
hand, in choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing, the
ﬁnal-good producer trades off the beneﬁts of ownership advantage from
vertical integration against the beneﬁts of better incentives for the in-
dependent supplier of parts. These trade-offs induce ﬁrms with different
productivity levels to sort by organizational form. We show that the
equilibrium sorting patterns depend on the wage differential between
the North and the South, on the ownership advantage in each one of
the countries, on the distribution of the bargaining power between ﬁnal-
good producers and suppliers of components, and on the headquarter
intensity of the technology.
A key result is that high-productivity ﬁrms acquire intermediate inputs
in the South whereas low-productivity ﬁrms acquire them in the North.
Among ﬁrms that source their inputs in the same country, the low-
productivity ﬁrms outsource whereas the high-productivity ﬁrms in-
source. In sectors with a very low intensity of headquarter services, no
ﬁrm integrates; low-productivity ﬁrms outsource at home whereas high-
productivity ﬁrms outsource abroad.
We also show how the prevalence of organizational forms, measured
by the fraction of ﬁrms that organize in the same way, depends on
industry characteristics that shape the sorting pattern and on the degree
of productivity dispersion across ﬁrms. Two results stand out. First, sec-
tors with more productivity dispersion rely more on imported inputs,576 journal of political economy
and within the group of headquarter-intensive sectors, integration is
more prevalent in sectors with more productivity dispersion. Second,
the higher a sector’s headquarter intensity, the less it relies on imported
inputs, and within the group of headquarter-intensive sectors, integra-
tion is more prevalent in sectors with higher headquarter intensity.
Our model also has interesting implications for a widening of the
wage gap between the North and the South, or a reduction of the trading
costs of intermediate inputs (both changes produce similar results). As
one would expect, reducing the costs of foreign sourcing raises the
fraction of ﬁrms that import intermediate inputs. In addition, however,
it raises the fraction of ﬁrms that outsource in each one of the countries.
As a result, arm’s-length trade rises relative to intraﬁrm trade.
As is evident from these results, our model provides rich predictions
about patterns of foreign trade and investment. Since we laid out the
empirical motivation for this study in the Introduction, it sufﬁces to
point out in these concluding comments that our approach helps to
better appreciate the complexity of trade and investment in a world in
which ﬁrms choose endogenously their organizational forms. It also
should help in designing empirical studies of the ever-evolving world
trading system.
Appendix
In the text, we measured the relative prevalence ofdifferentorganizationalforms
with the fraction of ﬁnal-good varieties produced under each type of organi-
zation. In this Appendix we show that the use of other measures yields similar
results.
First consider the case of market shares, that is, the fraction of industry sales
captured by each organizational form. It is straightforward to show that ﬁrm
revenues can be expressed as
(ma)/(1a) a/(1a) l X vw (h) k l R (v, X, h) p . k ll 1a[bh(1 b )(1 h)] kk
Therefore, in the benchmark component-intensive sector, the market share of
foreign outsourcing is
NS [V()V(v )]r (h) MO O S y p , (A1) MO NS N N [V()V(v )]r (h)[V(v )V(v )]r (h) MO O MO M O
where
l w(h) k l r (h) p k ll 1a[bh(1 b )(1 h)] kk
a/(1a)
N h l 1h 1 ww
p .( A 2 ) () ( ) ll [] ab 1b kk
When the productivity index v is drawn from a Pareto distribution with theglobal sourcing 577
shape parameter z, the distribution of ﬁrm sales is also Pareto with the shape
parameter . Making use of the properties of the Pareto distribu- z[a/(1 a)]
tion, we can express (A1) as
1 S y p . MO [z(1a)/a]1
NS N N w (h)( f f ) r (h) OO O O 1 1 SN N S ({ } ) [w (h)w (h)]f r (h) OO O O
Because , it follows that , and is increas-
NS N S NS S b p b p br (h)/r (h) p w (h)/w (h) y OO O O O O M O
ing in . This implies that, as in the text, the prevalence of southern
SN w (h)/w (h) OO
outsourcing is decreasing in the southern wage rate, in transport costs, and in
the importance of headquarter services as measured by h. Furthermore, because
, it is straightforward to show that an increase in dispersion (a fall in z)
N v 1 v MO M
raises the market share of ﬁnal-good producers outsourcing in the South.Finally,
a fall in the South’s bargaining power increases and when , a
SS w (h) r (h) h ! b OO
condition that may or may not be more restrictive than theconditionthatdeﬁnes
the component-intensive sector (i.e., ).
13 When , a fall in the bar-
∗ b (h) ! bh ! b
gaining power in the South raises the market share of southern outsourcing.
When, instead, , the effect is ambiguous. h 1 b
In the benchmark headquarter-intensive sector, sale revenues are
, where is given by
(ma)/(1a) a/(1a)ˆˆ X v R(h) R(h)
NN N N N ˆ R(h) p [V(v )V(v )]r (h)[V(v )V(v )]r (h) HO H O HV HO V
SN S S S [V(v )V(v )]r (h)[V()V(v )]r (h), (A3) HO HV O HO V
and is deﬁned in (A2). The market share of each type of organizational
l r (h) k
form is then
NN [V(v )V(v )]r (h) HO H O N y p , HO ˆ R(h)
NN N [V(v )V(v )]r (h) HV HO V N y p , HV ˆ R(h)
SN S [V(v )V(v )]r (h) HO HV O S y p , HO ˆ R(h)
SS [V()V(v )]r (h) HO V S y p .( A 4 ) HV ˆ R(h)
As is clear from equations (A3) and (A4), each market share is now a function
of all four cutoffs , , , and . This complicates the analysis relative to
NN S vv v v HH OH V H O
the text, but the results are similar.
First, a fall in the southern wage or in transport costs increases , ,
SS w (h) w (h) OV
, and , while leaving the ratios and unaffected.
SS S S S S r (h) r (h) w (h)/w (h) r (h)/r (h) OV O V O V
It is straightforward to check that, as in the text, the ratios , , and
SSSN y /yy /y HO HV HV HO
all increase. It follows that global production sharing, as measured by
NN y /y HO HV
the sum , increases, as does outsourcing relative to integration in each
SS y y HO HV
one of the countries. This implies that rises and falls. The overall effect
SN yy HO HV
on and depends on whether increases or decreases. If and
NS ˆ yy R(h) h 1 b HO HV
13 The inequality holds true in the low-tech sector when . This follows from
1 h ! bb ! 2
if and only if (see eq. [10]).
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is high enough, it can be shown that not only
NS SSN w /w w (h) 1 w (h) 1 w (h) 1 VOV
but also .
14 In this case, rises when southern
NS S N N ˆ w (h) r (h) 1 r (h) 1 r (h) 1 r (h) R(h) OV O V O
wages or transport costs fall. As a result, falls, whereas the effect on
NS yy HO HV
remains ambiguous. If instead h, b, and are such that falls, then both
NS ˆ w /wR (h)
and rise when southern wages or transport costs decline.
NS yy HO HV
Second, it is straightforward to show that an increase in the degree of dis-
persion reduces the market share ofﬁrmsoutsourcingintheNorthandincreases
the market share of ﬁrms integrating in the South. Furthermore, as in the text,
, , and are decreasing in z.
SS S S N N y yy /yy /y HO HV HV HO HV HO
Third, an increase in the output elasticity of headquarter services, h, increases
and for , as well as and for
NS l l N S ll w (h)/w (h) w (h)/w (h) l p N, S r (h)/r (h) r (h)/r (h) OO V O O O V O
. As in the text, the relative prevalence of domestic integration increases, l p N, S
both in absolute terms and relative to domestic outsourcing, whereas the relative
prevalence of foreign outsourcing falls, both in absolute terms and relative to
foreign integration. Furthermore, under mild assumptions, the market share of
ﬁrms that import components falls.
Fourth, consider the effect of , . An increase in raises without
lS S b l p N, S bw (h) VV V
affecting the slopes of the other proﬁt functions. Furthermore, if h is high
enough, namely , this also increases relative to , , and
SS S N h 1 br (h) r (h) r (h) VV O V
. In this case, increases and declines, whereas the ratio does
NS S N N r (h) yy y /y OH V H O H O H V
not change. The only difference from the text is that the market share of ﬁnal-
good producers who use imported components is now affected by . The effect
S bV
depends again on whether increases or decreases with . As before, if
S ˆ R(h) bV
and is high enough, then , and is
NS S S N N ˆ h 1 b w /w r (h) 1 r (h) 1 r (h) 1 r (h) R(h) VOVO




An increase in affects prevalence similarly to the text when . In this
N N bh 1 b V V
case, domestic integration gains market share relative to both domestic out-
sourcing and foreign outsourcing. As a result, the prevalence of vertical inte-
gration relative to outsourcing rises in both countries. As in the text,
is increasing in , whereas the effect on the other market shares depends
NN yb HV V
on whether is increasing or decreasing in .
N ˆ R(h) bV
Finally, as in the text, an increase in the primitive bargaining power b reduces
the ratios , , and for . Moreover, it also
Sl Nl NS w (h)/w (h) w (h)/w (h) w (h)/w (h) l p N, S VO VO V V
reduces the ratios , , and for . As a result,
Sl N l N S r (h)/r (h) r (h)/r (h) r (h)/r (h) l p N, S VO VO VV
the market share of ﬁrms outsourcing in each country increases relative to the
market share of ﬁrms integrating in the same country, just as in the text. The
effect on the market share of ﬁrms that import components ( ) is, how-
SS y y HO HV
ever, ambiguous.
Using output of each organizational form as a measure of relative prevalence
also yields similar results. In particular, it can be shown that equations (A1)–
(A4) apply to this case, with replacing . The comparative
ll 1/a l ˜ r (h) p [r (h)] r (h) kk k
statics are therefore similar to those for market shares.
14 In particular, ensures that and , whereas
SS NN S h 1 br (h) 1 r (h) r (h) 1 r (h) r (h) 1 VO V O O
holds true as long as
N r (h) V
NNN 1hh 1h w b 1  b VV 1 . () () ( ) S w b 1  bglobal sourcing 579
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